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-page iwoSTATEMENT OF ISSUES

Is a "pro serr appellant to bo L< i : * - \^

. M H C stringent

andards as an appellant who iu represented i..v a jr. f^ssioual
w trained individual?
Does a "pro se" appellant have a rx(-h

- his appeal

>ard on it!s rif-r'^s, regardless -.r h^w .inar LfU.L Lv L<; has argu^ci
Is case in the low^-r oou.'U.]?
-!:.\.1 Court

. Does an accused person have the right t(. 'ap-^a

f Appeals, of a crii-ij.rial matter, under Lhu ••\tu\i uontitituiion
rticle 1 § 12?
.. Does the State of Utah have to give "fu;i I- J', and Credit"
jQ a "public act"

the St,at,e of Wyoming, under Article IV

\ 1 of the U.S. Constitution?
5. Does the State of Utah hav^ lhu puwer to suspend a "license
properly issued by the State

»• i ti^V

6. Can a person, who has in his possession, a .a : . . properlyissued license be charged under UC 4-1-2-28, "Driving Under Suspension of License"?

AUTHORITIES RELIED UPON
Constitutional Provisions
Utah Constitution
Article 1 § 12
"In crimi,. J .

»" -.'« cuiiunj; I ho accused shall have

the right to « »

:

appea

-->ses.* * *"

U.S. Cnnr, h i t.uliun
Article IV § 1
"Full FAith and Credit shall b« fjSv.-r:

:

ach

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

This is a criminal matter which was begun in the Monticello
Justice of the Peace Court, appealled first to the Circuit Court,
and then to the Utah Court of Appeals.

Certiorari was granted

to the Appellant on the issues stated herein, on June 12, 1989Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court by Rule 26 of
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, and by Rule 4-2 of the
Rtiles of the Utah Supreme Court.
Further jurisdiction is granted by the means of the grant
of Certiorari, issued by this Court on June 12, 1989-

-page threetate to the public Acts, Records and judicial Proceedings of
.•very other State * * * "
Statutes
Utah Code Annotated.
UC 4-1-2-1 (n) (1983)
"License means the priviledge to operate a motor
vehicle over the highways of this state."
UC 41-2-28 (1983)
" A person whose Operator's license has been suspended
or revoked, as provided by this act, and who drives
a<\y motor behicle upon the highways of this state
while that license is suspended or rafcoked is guilty
of a crime, * * *"
UC 41-17-3 Driver!s License Compact Article II (b)
""•Home sta+e1 means the state which has issued
and has the power to suspend ot fcevoke the use
of the license or permit to operate a motor vehicle."
(emphasis added)
UC 41-2-603 (5) "Driver1s License Compact.
"The licensing authority of the issuing jurisdiction
may not suspend the privilege of a motorist for
whom a report has been issued."
Wyoming Statues
WS 31-9-204
tf* -x- # Uporc receipt of such certification that
the operating -nriviledge of a resident of this
State has been suspended or revoked in any such
other st«te pursuant to a law providing for its
suspension or revocation for failure to provide

security for the payment of judgements arising
out of a motor vehicle accident or for failure
to deposit both security and proof of financial
responsibility * * * the superintendant shall suspend
license of such resident * * *"
(This statute was in place when defendant was convicted
but Wyoming has since joined the compact, making
its laws almost verbatim to Utah's)
Law
Haines v Kerner 404 U.S. 519 (1971)
II# # # allegations * * * h o w e r inartfully pleaded
are sufficient to call for the opportunity to call
for the opportunity to offer supporting evidence.* * *
the

,?

pro se" complaint, which we hold to less >tri/igent

standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,** *
Accordingly, * * * we conclude he is entitled
to offer proof- * * "
State v. .Johnson 635 P.2d 36 (1981 Utah) at 37
"In all criminal prosecutions an accused has a
constitutional right to a timely appeal from his
convictions. Utah Constitution Art. 1 §12 * * *"
State v. French, 117 N.H. 785 at 787,788, 378 A.2d 1377(1977)
"The conduct proscribed by RSA 262:27-b* * * is
explicate, driving

f

after [defendants] "license"

to operate has been suspended or revoked" No mention
is made of driving after revokation or suspension
of a nonresident operator!s priviledge.
-x- -x- -x- Defendant's nonresident operating pxuvileCaes
were effectively revoked * * * We hold only that
the defendant has nr>+ ^ ^ 1 - ^ J -^

of RSA 262:27-b * * *
Defendants exceptions sustained; case remanded"

STATEMENT OF CASE
This is a criminal case in which the Defendant Lee Christensen
(hereinafter referred to as Christensen) ip charged with a

n

Drivin b

Under Suspension, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Section
41-2-28, Utah Code (1985), as adopted by Ordinance NO. 1985-2
in Section 11-321 of the Code of Revised Ordinaces of the City
of Monticello".

The facts relevant to the case are these:

1. Christensen was issued a valid Drivers License by the
State of Wyomin on July 17, 1984, which was made to expire on
July 17, 1988.
2. While visiting family in Utah in October 2, 1986, he
was involved in an accident at which time he did produce his
valid Wyoming license, and was cited f^r "Improper lookout"
Whic u fine he paid.
3. On September 3, 1987 while traveling with a friend into
Utah in pursuit of work, Christensen was stopped inside the
city limits of Monxicello, produced his valid Wyoming license
and was arrested for "Drivi g on Suspension" taken in front
of a magistrate, and posted a $200.00 casH bond.
4. On or about October 26, 1987, an information was filed
alleging Driving on Suspension ( \iCN\ ^7

*(Xc^L u ^ 3> )

Christ nsen filed a Motion to diswyss based upon his valid licen°e
supported by the Abstract of his Wyoming licesne which showed
his status a^r Clear,

and further claiming Utah had no power

to suspend his license (

\TC\TA Q * vcxaC O

)

5. On January 8, 1988, Christensen appeared before the

-page sixHonorable Justice Wright for trial, where he argued his motion
for dismissal, but was found guilty and sentensed to $200.00
fine, thirty days in jail with jail time suspended of payment
of fine, and his bai1 was ordered forfeited in leiu of fine.
He then appealed to the Circuit Court.
6. On March 31, 1988, a Trial deNoyo was held in front
of the Honorable Judge Bruce K. Halliday of the Twelth (now
Seventh) Circuit Court.

He renew his motion f^r dismissal and

entered his abstract of license as evidence.
He was a^ain

found guilty with the same sentence i^pcsad.

7. On April 28, Defendant filed notice of appeal to the
Utah "'t Court of Appeals.

He filed his Brief

on December 17,

1988. On F^buary 23, his appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction as he had failed" to establish

t^a+- he raised his issues

in earlier Courts.
On March 23, 1989 his petition for rehearing was denied.

SUMMARY OF ARGUEMENT
Christensen contends that the dismissal of his appeal was
c.n+rary to his right to appeal, in that he did raise the issue
in lower courts, although not very artfully, as he is not law
trained.
Fur+her, Christensen contends that the State of Utah may
not suspend his license, as it was issued by the State of Wyoming*
The State of Utah must go through the appropriate channels and
have Wyoming suspend the license, and unless it does exactly
that it must recognise his license as valid, and therefoe cannot
charge him with Driving on Suspension of License.

This is a

case of first impression in the State of Utah, and involves
supstancial rights of individuals as well as of States.
ARGUEMENT ONE
As a npro se" defendant is uninformed of legal terminology
but has tried at all phases of this proceeding to challange
the Law he £iis charged with violating.

He has to the best of

his ability to prove his case, and should no be held to the
same standanrds as an attorney.
ARGUEMENT TWO
According to Haines v. Kerner, although a "pro se" may
be inartful or inarticulate in his pleadings, and arguements,
he is entitled to have his appeal heard on the merits of the
case.

The Utah Court of Appeals did err in dismissing Christensen1s

appeal, without addressing the merit's of the case.

Christensen,

although unable tc argue succinctly in the lower Court did raise
a substancial issue, and further did always meet h1' s filing
obligations timely, and attemted to provide adequate arguement
to prove his case.
ARGUEMENT THREE
When an appellant timely meets his obligations the Court
sQid in State v. Johnson, that he has a right toi^appBal_jiiadi^l!-^—^^
the Utah Constitution Article 1 § 12.

If his appeal is limited

by his inability to correctly assert his issue in the lower
Courts, or his inability to provide transcripts, then his right
is substancially limited.

The Utah Constitution does not place

any such limitations on the ^ight to appeal, nor does it state
that he may only appeal to the Circuit Court
of the Peace Court.

from the Justice

If an appellant beleives that his appeal

will change the outcome of the issue, and if h° has tried within

his ability to properly perfect his appeal, as a "pro se" he
certainly has a right to have his appeal heard on itfs merits,
although il represented by counsel, one may expect more professionally worded arguements, and more properly phrased objections.
ARGUEMENT FOUR
A Driver's License

is a public Act, under the meaning

of the U.S. Constitution Art.1 § 12, as it is an act empowered
by the legislature, and endorsed by statute.
States of the Union, must give
and may not suspend it.

As such the other

!f

full Faith and Credit" to it,

The State of Utah reco^n"1'ses this in

the "Driverfs License Compact" when it defines the "Home state
as the state which has the power to suspend the license, and
further

ays that the issuing jurisdiction cannot suspend the

license of a mutorist against whom a report has been filed.
ARGUEMENT FIVE
Within the "Driver's License Compact" and the Wyoming Statutes
31-9-204 agree about the procedure for revoking the license
of a non resident motorist.

If their is cause to suspend the

license of a non resident, the "issuing jurisdiction" may contact
the "ho™e state" (in this case Wyoming).

Wyoming says it will

suspend the license of a person fo~ the reasons w^ich alledgedjy
Christensenfs license was supposed to be suspended

Since the

State of Wyoming, on the date in question was unaware of any
such attempt to suspend Christensens license, apparantly Utah
never took the steps available to it to remove Christensen!s
license.

The State of Utah has no such power as aforesaid.
ARGUEMENT SIX

State v. French is the only Case of which the appellant
is aware, whoge circumstances are similiar to the*.

The defendant's

alid out of state license, was said to be suspended, and ghe
ras thus charged.

The statutes cited in this case are similar

" construction, to UtahTs Statutes.
)e controlled by that one.

Therefore, this case should

In t^at case the Court ruled that

4s. French could not be charged with "Driving Under Suspension".
Christensen, contends that he too is innocent of that charge.
SUMMARY
T^e State of Utah has a valid procedure for suspending
the license of a Wyoming resident, and it failed to properly
proceed.

The State of Utah further has no power to suspend

a license issued by Wyoming, without following that proceed^r^.
Since Utah failed to exercise it*s option, to suspend Ghristensen1s
license- it m^st recognise his license as valid, and he may
not be charged with "Driving Under Suspension".
The Court of Appeal0 erred when it dismissed his appeal,
and did not hear his case on itrs merits.

Ghristensen is not

Law trained, and is not particularly articulate, but he has
always attempted to assert his issues although he may not have
done so, correctly or artfully.

The dismissal of

his appeal

substancially^violated Christensenfs right to appeal.
Christensen moves the Court to reverse his conviction,
and order a return of his monies (bail and fine) with interest.
Dated this

2~-d day of July 1989.

Respectfully submitted

Lee Cnristensen
Pro Se

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that a t^ue and correct copy of the foregoing
Brief was sent to the opposing Counsel by depositing it in the
U S. Mail, first class psotage prepaid, addn-ssed to
Lyle Anderson
P.O. Box 275
Monticello, Utah 84535
on the 2#th day of July, 1989.
(four Copies mailed)
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